


# CryptoPanel

edycja #12

Już za moment  
zaczynamy...



# CryptoPanel





THALES

CLICO



# CryptoPanel



# CryptoPanel

## edycja #12

W infrastrukturze hybrydowej: cloud in on-prem wymaga się wydajnej i niezawodnej a jednocześnie wysoce bezpiecznej transmisji danych pomiędzy zasobami.  
Czy i jak można sobie z tym poradzić?



# CryptoPanel

dziś dyskutują



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


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Pre-sales Consultant

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mob. +48 603 056 667



# CryptoPanel



problem

# co nas boli...

- ▶ Jesteśmy przedsiębiorstwem z branży zbrojeniowej
- ▶ Korzystamy z zasobów lokalnych i kilku chmur
- ▶ Chcemy zaszyfrować ruch pomiędzy swoimi zasobami zarówno:
  - Większymi lokalizacjami (zakłady, ośrodki badawcze)
  - Biurami
  - Chmurami (publiczne i „branżowe”)
  - Pojedynczymi zasobami (lokalnie lub w chmurze)

▶ Do ochrony komunikacji niejawnie/tajnej posiadamy osobną infrastrukturę

▶ Nie posiadamy infrastruktury sieciowej jednego typu

- Eksploatujemy m.in. Metroethernet, bezpośrednie łącza światłowodowe, MPLS, „IP-VPN”, GSM, ..)
- Planujemy jej rozbudowę

▶ w jakie rozwiązanie zainwestować?

▶ jak zapewnić bezpieczeństwo ruchu do/z CSP bez korzystania z ich VPN?

▶ interesuje nas coś więcej niż „włącz szyfrowanie” na poziomie sieci (kontrola: algorytmu, kluczy, częstości zmiany kluczy, źródło entropii, itd.):

Security Information	
Configuration:	802.1X (MACsec)
Encryption:	GCM(Software) 
EAP Method:	eapPeap(eapMschapv2)
Server:	
Credential Type:	Username/Password

▶ no i jeszcze: odporność kwantowa?



# Dla ustalenia uwagi: co mamy do szyfrowania ruchu/łączy?

## L1 (szyfrowania łącza fizycznego)


- Multiplexery DWDM
- Transceivery, konwertery światłowodowe,
- Modemy, ...

## L2 (MACSec)

## L3 (IPSec)

## L4 (aplikacja)

- Np. S/MIME,



<https://www.soisk-me.pl/klasa-iv-sieci/model-iso-osi-i-tcp-ip>





# Czy VPN nie wystarczy?

The screenshot shows a web application with a header containing Google Cloud, THALES, and SEC&DEV logos. The main content area is titled "Przemycanie wrażliwych informacji w datagramach ICMP - nadajnik". It includes a form for "Host docelowy" (127.0.0.1) and a section for "Wrażliwe informacje do przemycenia" containing a list of sensitive data. At the bottom, there are fields for "Klucz szyfrowania" (SI\_secret\_key\_8) and "Szyfrowanie AES-256".

The screenshot shows a Python application interface with a header containing Google Cloud, THALES, and SEC&DEV logos. The main content area is titled "Komunikat niezaszyfrowany" and "Zaszyfrowany komunikat". It displays a table with encrypted data and a section for "Przeznaczone informacje wrażliwe". Below the table, there is a "Steganografia - Odbiornik" section with Python code for decryption and steganography.

## Scenariusze omijania sieciowych systemów zabezpieczeń

60 Minutes Janusz Nawrat

ICMP, UDP, ARP, DNS, Broadcast, Multicast, Unicast, NTP, Steganofonia, ...

Pakiet/ramka wcale nie musi dotrzeć do odbiorcy wystarczy go „podłuszczyć”...

# CryptoPanel



rozwiązanie



# Rozwiązanie – szyfrowanie wysokich prędkości



## CV1000

---

- Hardened virtual encryption function
- Ideal for Cloud, Software Defined Networks (SDN) and Server-to-Server communications, East-West connectivity



## CN6000

---

- Up to 4x10 Gbps Encryptor
- Rack-mountable, fully redundant robust design
- Ideal for private networks and datacenter interconnects



## CN4000 Series

---

- Up to 1 Gbps Encryptor
- Certified, low-cost, high-performance
- Small form factor ideal for remote locations such as Critical Infrastructure, SCADA, Energy, remote video feeds



## CN9000

---

- Certified multipoint 100 Gbps encryptors
- Designed for next gen datacenters and core networks



# Kiedyś


A family of dedicated appliances that encrypt data at wire speed across:

Carrier Layer 2 services

Metro Area Networks

Ethernet Wide Area Networks

Data Centre Interconnects




# Dziś z TIM

A family of dedicated appliances that encrypt data at wire speed across:

Any network !

Now....



# Nowy tryb pracy: 'Transport Independent Mode'

## Line & MAC mode

- Layer 2 Ethernet encryption only
- Policy based on remote MAC address in frame (MAC mode)

## VLAN mode

- Layer 2 Ethernet encryption only
- Policy based on VLAN ID in frame

## Transport Independent Mode

- Layer 2 Ethernet OR layer 3 IP OR layer 4 TCP/UDP encryption
- Policy based on IP address and/or port numbers

Global Mode	bypass all
Operational Mode	[TIM, AES256-CTR]
Connection Mode	TIM
Crypto Mode	MAC addresses
Group Key Sender ID	VLAN IDs
IGMP/MLD Processing	[encryption ID: 99]
Management Ethernet	FE0E FE0F

```
CV1000>con
Connection mode: TIM
CV1000>con -h
Usage: con <CR>          Display current Connection mode status
                        -m          Enable MAC Connection mode
                        -v          Enable VLAN Connection mode
                        -T          Enable TIM Connection mode
                        -h          This help message
```

# Network Independent = Smart network encryption


- Tunnel free payload encryption where it makes sense
  - *For performance*
  - *For security*
  - *For network*
- AES-256 CTR/GCM mode:
  - *Confidentiality only OR*
  - *Confidentiality + Authentication*
- Simple key management
- Per traffic flow encryption policies:
  - *Layer 2 – Ethernet*
  - *Layer 3 – IPv4/v6*
  - *Layer 4 (IP + Port)*
    - *NAT pass-through*
    - *Netflow/Jflow support*
    - *Policy based routing*





# Przykład: VoIP encryption – MacSec, IPSec & HSE TIM


## IP Packet in Ethernet Frame



## IPsec ESP-AES-256 ESP-SHA-HMAC +76 Bytes



## MACsec pr Ethernet +24 Bytes





## TIM – Ethernet 8 bytes ( + 16 for confidentiality)



# Performance


Typical Network traffic Profile




Thales High Speed Encryption Offers  
Better Bandwidth Efficiency and Latency Performance

# Rzeczywiste testy 5G – HSE vs. IPsec


## Measured Throughput (1427 Frame)



## Average Jitter uSec




## Measured Latency uSec



Toronto to Quebec City through wired ENCQR 5G Transport Core

# Architektura



# Do czego może służyć wirtualny szyfrator?

## CV1000 is NOT a cheap HSE


- It has been designed for specific use cases
- Suitable only for existing virtualized environments
  - *Please don't try to fit a square peg in a round hole*

## Possible use cases .....

- East-West encryption inside a data centre
- North-south encryption in/out of data centre
- SD-WAN environments
- Cloud gateway
- Other....

## Everything else ..... hardware

# Konfiguracja



## SITES A and B


- Azure is hosting WebServer with sensitive content
- Multiple machines from Office want to access WebServer

## SECURE COMMUNICATION


- Only machines in Secured A can talk to machines in Secured zone B
- Machines outside of Secured zone A can't talk to machines in Secured zone B as they receive AES encrypted traffic they don't understand

# Szczegółowa konfiguracja

## Office



## Azure



CM - User: admin Mode: Authentication, Privacy (CM1.ini)

Discover Activate Certify Key Manage Upgrade

CM7

Encryptors Network

51.105.115.149() 192.168.7.20(CS1000Office)

Expand All Collapse All >> 15 day trial active. 1 day(s) remaining. >> Expand All Collapse All Export

Policy Refresh Apply Copy To..

Operational Mode [TIM, KDF, time, AES256-GCM]

VLAN Settings [bypass header: enabled, 8100, 8100]

Group Key Sender ID 200

IP/IGMP/MLD Processing [encryption ID: 99, bypass IGMP MLD: d

GCM Authentication shim + payload

Management Ethertypes [FC0F, FC0E]

Limited KID Range  enabled

Initialise Configuration ...

Policy Extensions

KDF

Protocol

Protocol - Ethertypes

ISID Rules

IP Rules Refresh Apply Copy To..

Action For Unlisted IPs discard

Refresh Apply Copy To.. Add Delete

IP Address	P...	Pro...	...	Action
86.61.75.243	32	tcp(6)	=	encrypt L4
10.0.4.0	16	tcp(6)	=	encrypt L4

Global Mode encrypt all

Operational Mode [TIM, KDF, AES256-GCM]

VLAN Settings [bypass header: enabled, 8100, 8100]

Group Key Sender ID 100

IP/IGMP/MLD Processing [encryption ID: 99, bypass IGMP MLD: d

GCM Authentication shim + payload

Management Ethertypes [FC0F, FC0E]

Limited KID Range  enabled

Policy Extensions

KDF

Protocol

Protocol - Ethertypes

IP Rules Refresh Apply Copy To..

Action For Unlisted IPs discard

Refresh Apply Copy To.. Add Delete

IP Address	P...	Pro...	...	Action
51.105.115.149	32	tcp(6)	=	encrypt L4
192.168.88.0	16	*	*	bypass
8.8.8.8	32	*	*	bypass

Connections Refresh Apply Copy To..

Remote CLI





# Nauczki i raczej nie znajdziecie w dokumentacji...

## A co z wydajnością przy dużych pakietach?

- Wspieramy ramki jumbo

## Uwaga na transcovery!

- Testujemy i wspieramy „nasze”
- Innych firm mogą działać ale nie odpowiadamy za to!

## no i jeszcze: odporność kwantowa?



# Comparison of conventional and quantum security levels

Table 1 - Impact of Quantum Computing on Common Cryptographic Algorithms

Cryptographic Algorithm	Type	Purpose	Impact from large-scale quantum computer
AES	Symmetric key	Encryption	Larger key sizes needed
SHA-2, SHA-3	-----	Hash functions	Larger output needed
RSA	Public key	Signatures, key establishment	No longer secure
ECDSA, ECDH (Elliptic Curve Cryptography)	Public key	Signatures, key exchange	No longer secure
DSA (Finite Field Cryptography)	Public key	Signatures, key exchange	No longer secure



1



2

# Thales HSE - Quantum Safe strategy

## Providing a transition path to Post Quantum Security



Quantum entropy sources



Quantum Key Distribution



Quantum Resistant Algorithms



**OPEN QUANTUM SAFE**

*software for prototyping  
quantum-resistant cryptography*



IBM Research



**THALES**

# NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography Program Enters 'Selection Round'

Chosen algorithms will become part of first standard devised to counter quantum decryption threat.

July 22, 2020



Credit: B. Hayes/NIST

A select few algorithms, some of which fall into one of three mathematical "families," are undergoing a final leg of review. Some will form the core of the first post-quantum cryptography standard.

## Seven algorithms are finalists:

- Classic McEliece
- CRYSTALS-KYBER
- NTRU
- SABER
  
- CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM
- FALCON
- Rainbow


**HSE 5.2.0 firmware will support all seven algorithms in all products**

# CryptoPanel



podsumowanie

# Architektura – propozycja rozwiązania



# Podsumowanie, czyli co potrzeba...

## Do 1 Gbps (dla lokalizacji)

- 3x...
- Ethernet Encryptor, 1 GBPS, External AC, CN4020 **8 910,00** 943-000276-001-000

## Do 2 Gbps (z możliwością podniesienia przepustowości do 10Gbps)

- 2x (6140 – to 4 w jednym!)
- Network Encryptor, 5.0 GBPS, RATE LIMITED, DUAL AC, CN6140 **26 200,00** 943-000120-001-000
- Network Encryptor, 1.25GBPS rate upgrade **2 240,00** 943-000182-001-000

### STEP 2 SELECT TRANSCEIVERS

#### XFP for 10GB (CN6100 Only)

XFP, 10GBASE-SR (300M), Multi-Mode, 850NM	<b>470,00</b>	904-40004-001-000
XFP, OC192 SR-1 & 10GBASE-LR/LW (10KM), Single Mode, 1310NM	<b>650,00</b>	904-40001-001-000
XFP, OC192 IR-2 & 10GBASE-ER/EW (40KM), Single Mode, 1550NM	<b>1 500,00</b>	904-40002-001-000
XFP, OC192 LR-2A & 10GBASE-ZR/ZW (80KM), Single Mode, 1550NM	<b>2 980,00</b>	904-40003-001-000

#### SFP+ for 1/10GB (CN6140 Only)

Transceiver, 1G/10G, LC, Multimode, 850NM, SFP+	<b>85,03</b>	943-000216-001-000
Transceiver, 1G/10G, LC, 10KM, Single Mode, 1310NM, SFP+	<b>225,00</b>	943-000241-001-000
Transceiver, 10G, LC, 40KM, Single Mode, 1550NM, SFP+	<b>805,00</b>	943-000255-001-000
Transceiver, 10G, LC, 80KM, Single Mode, 1550NM, SFP+	<b>1 210,00</b>	943-000267-001-000





# Podsumowanie, czyli co potrzeba...

## Do chmury (CV1000) 1x

- 1x... do wyboru do koloru:
- Thales Virtual Encryptor, CV1000, DPDK, Term Limited, 1-year, Enhanced Support **875,00** 943-000019-001-000
- Thales Virtual Encryptor, CV1000, DPDK, Term Limited, 3-year, Enhanced Support **1 750,00** 943-000012-001-000
- Thales Virtual Encryptor, CV1000, DPDK, Perpetual **1 170,00** 943-000114-001-000

## Zarządzanie:

- **CM7 za darmo**
- **SMC:**
- SMC, Small Deployment, up to 10 Encryptors, Electronic Delivery **3 010,00** 906-000063-001-000



# CryptoPanel



# CryptoPanel



A teraz quiz



<https://forms.office.com/r/PPaKkghaT3>